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The Presumption of Limited Liability for
Foreign Government Corporations:
Myth versus Reality
I. INTRODUCTION
In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
de Cuba' ("Banco"), the United States Supreme Court first con-
fronted the issue whether foreign government corporations are enti-
tled to a presumption of limited liability as are private domestic
corporations. 2  The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor, found that foreign corporations were entitled to the same
presumption of limited liability as private corporations.3 In addition,
the Court examined and discussed the circumstances under which it
would pierce a foreign government corporation's veil of limited
liability. 4
This Note analyzes the Court's reasoning and seeks to show that
the Banco holding does not comport with the true nature of govern-
ment corporations. Specifically, this Note will survey the traditional
rationales underlying the presumption of limited liability and demon-
strate how these rationales are inapplicable to government corpora-
tions. Finally, this Note argues that a presumption of unlimited
liability should apply to government corporations due to their unique
nature.
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In 1959, Cuba underwent a violent political revolution. 5 The
revolutionary government, headed by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che
1. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
2. The Court acknowledged the widespread and growing use of such corporations by
many nations and the features peculiar to such institutions. Id. at 624. For example, govern-
ment corporations are created by statute and managed within parameters specified in the en-
abling statute. Id.
3. Id. at 613.
4. Id. at 632. For the reasons justifying this piercing of the corporate veil, see infra text
accompanying notes 100-145. By the time Banco reached the Supreme Court, the Republic of
Cuba had been substituted for Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, also known as
Bancec. Banco, 462 U.S. at 616.
5. See CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 42 (J. Rudolph 3d ed. 1987).
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Guerva, reformed Cuba's political, military, economic and cultural
policies.6 By virtue of the ideology underlying the reform movement,
Cuban-Soviet relations improved to the detriment of Cuban-United
States affairs. 7  In 1960, the Eisenhower Administration punished
Cuba economically for its pro-Soviet stance by suspending all sugar
imports from Cuba.8 In retaliation, Cuba nationalized various United
States and foreign properties in Cuba. 9
Among the properties nationalized were Citibank's branches in
Cuba.'0 Prior to the nationalizations, Citibank had issued a letter of
credit 1 in the amount of $193,280.30 at the request of a Canadian-
Cuban sugar company for a sugar purchase made by Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec"). 12 In the regular course of
business, Banco Nacional de Cuba 13 presented the letter of credit to
Citibank in Bancec's favor, just days before the nationalizations took
place. 14 By the time of payment on the letter of credit, the Cuban
government had acquired Citibank's branches in Cuba without com-
pensating the bank for this takeover.' 5 As a result, Citibank informed
Bancec that it would credit the amount to Banco Nacional's account
and use the balance of Bancec's account as a setoff against the value of
the nationalized branches. 16 In sum, Citibank took control of the re-
mainder of Bancec's funds to account for the loss Citibank suffered by
the nationalization.
On February 1, 1961, Bancec filed suit in the United States Dis-
6. Id. For example, extensive agrarian reforms were undertaken while Cuba, as a
whole, was guided toward militancy, idealism and revolutionary fervor. Id. at 46.
7. Id. at 43-46.
8. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 505 F. Supp.
412, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
9. Cuban Law No. 851, enacted July 6, 1960, authorized the President and the Prime
Minister to "proceed to nationalize, through forced expropriation, the properties or enterprises
owned by physical and corporate persons who are nationals of the United States of North
America." Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913,
916 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
10. Banco, 658 F.2d at 905-06.
11. A letter of credit is essentially a promissory note. However, the promisor is not the
importer but rather the importer's bank. T. CLASEN, FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT: A
LEGAL GUIDE 92 (1987).
12. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
613 (1983).
13. Banco Nacional de Cuba was Cuba's central bank. Id.
14. Id. at 614.
15. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 505 F. Supp.
412, 420-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
16. In essence, Citibank was trying to satisfy its claim with the only source of Cuban
funds available to it. Banco, 462 U.S. at 615.
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trict Court to recover the money alleging that Citibank had wrong-
fully exercised the setofl.' 7 However, before Citibank filed an answer,
Bancec was dissolved.' 8 At first, Bancec's commercial export activi-
ties were assigned to Empresa Cubana de Exportaciones, a newly-cre-
ated government corporation of the Republic of Cuba. 19 Then
Empresa dissolved and assigned its sugar exporting functions to an-
other Cuban government corporation. 20 In effect, Bancec's function
as a trading company became scattered throughout various depart-
ments of the Cuban government.
When Citibank filed its answer and counterclaim 2' on March 8,
1961, Bancec had completed dividing its functions and dissolution
proceedings.22 On July 7, 1961, Bancec and Citibank agreed to re-
place Bancec with the Republic of Cuba, specifically, its Ministry of
Foreign Trade, as the plaintiff.23
B. Procedural History
In 1977, the district court held a bench trial and, after hearing
evidence on the legal independence of Bancec, 24 granted Citibank's
counterclaim. The court based its opinion on two grounds. First, it
held that Bancec was an alter ego of the Cuban government. 25 The
district court principally relied on Bancec's engagement in "conduct
of the sort . . .tend[ing] to be supervised and managed by Govern-
ment."' 26 Second, the court found that the strong equities of the case
supported Citibank's counterclaim.27
17. Banco, 505 F. Supp. at 418.
18. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
615-16 (1983).
19. Id. at 615.
20. Id. at 615-16.
21. Citibank's counterclaim was for the value of its branches nationalized by Cuba on
September 17, 1960. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 505
F. Supp. 412, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
22. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
616 (1983).
23. Id. Apparently the reason for the substitution was that the Ministry of Foreign
Trade had become the de facto operator of Bancec and its progeny.
24. Banco, 505 F. Supp. at 429. The district court could have undertaken further analy-
sis of the managerial, financial and structural independence of Bancec vis-a-vis the Ministry of
Foreign Trade.
25. Id. at 425.
26. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 505 F. Supp.
412, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
27. Id. at 429-30. The court based this conclusion primarily on the finding that Cuba had
violated international law by nationalizing property without providing adequate compensation.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court. 28 The appellate court explicitly rejected the "government con-
duct" criterion used by the district court.29 Rather, the Second Cir-
cuit held that courts should recognize the independence of
government corporations unless the dependent corporation played a
"key role" 30 in the matter giving rise to the counterclaim. 31 Because
the court of appeals found Bancec not liable for the acts of the Cuban
government, the court held that the counterclaim had no legal basis
32
and denied Citibank's subsequent motion for a rehearing en banc.
However, the Supreme Court granted Citibank's writ of certiorari 33
and allowed the counterclaim.
34
III. PREVIOUS DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING CUBAN
CORPORATIONS
To fully understand the impact of the Supreme Court's opinion,
some preliminary observations about the Banco case are necessary.
Initially, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set forth its
"key role" doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City
Bank of New York ("Banco J").35 The court in Banco I allowed a
similar offset by Citibank against the value of Citibank branches na-
tionalized by Cuba. 36 The rationale for the decision was that Banco
Nacional, as Cuba's central bank, had actively cooperated or played a
key role in the nationalization effort.
37
28. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
29. Id. at 917.
30. The court did not provide a legal definition for "key role." However, it recited facts
that may indicate what constitutes a "key role." The court emphasized that it was Banco
Central, and specifically its president Che Guevara, who ordered occupation of Citibank's
branches. Likewise, it was Banco Central officials who took over day-to-day operation of the
nationalized branches. Id. at 918.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 920.
33. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 459 U.S. 942
(1982).
34. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
633 (1983).
35. 478 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1973). For a possible definition of "key role," see supra
note 30.
36. In Banco I, Citibank sold certain collateral on a loan to Banco Nacional de Cuba. It
also attempted to partially offset the money against the value of its nationalized branches. Id.
at 192.
37. Id. at 193. The court of appeals based its decision on the belief that where a "key
role" is played by an entity in the nationalization, the entity is more culpable for the acts
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The Second Circuit reapplied the "key role" doctrine in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N. Y Trust Co. ("Banco II").
3 8
In Banco II, Banco Nacional sued certain New York banks, including
Chemical Bank, for the return of funds belonging to Banco Nacional
itself and other Cuban nationalized banks.39 Chemical Bank counter-
claimed to offset those funds against loans it had extended to the
Cuba Electric Company, a company whose assets had also been na-
tionalized by the Cuban government. 4° The court found that the key
role doctrine did not validate the counterclaim 4 I because Banco Na-
cional had not participated in the electric company's nationaliza-
tion.42 Instead, the court developed a new basis for allowing the
counterclaim. 43 It deemed Banco Nacional to be an agent of Cuba
which sought funds for Cuba's benefit. Based on this new "agency"
ground, the court upheld the counterclaim."4 Banco Nacional then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
A. Inapplicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The first issue that the Supreme Court considered was whether
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA")45 substan-
tively or procedurally affected the case.46 The legislative history of
the FSIA convinced the Court that the FSIA had no effect on the
application of substantive law.47 The House Report on the FSIA indi-
cated that "[t]he bill is not intended to affect the substantive law of
committed. Therefore, there is justification for imposing certain burdens, such as a counter-
claim, on the entity.
38. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
39. Id. at 905.
40. Cuban Electric was a Florida corporation controlled by United States investors. Id.
at 906-07. However, most of its assets were in Cuba where it operated an electric utility. Id. at
907.
41. Id. at 905.
42. Id. at 910.
43. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903, 911 (2d
Cir. 1981).
44. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1983).
46. A major purpose of the FSIA is to codify existing "restrictive" principles of sovereign
immunity. Under this view, a foreign government is shielded from suit based on its public
acts. However, a government remains exposed to suit based on its commercial activities and
other private conduct. See generally H.R. REI'. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
47. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
621 (1983).
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liability... [n]or is it intended to affect... the attribution of responsi-
bility between or among entities of a foreign state ... or whether an
entity sued is liable in whole or in part for the claimed wrong."' 48 The
Court further stated that "[o]ur resolution of that question [Bancec's
liability] is guided by the policies articulated by Congress in enacting
the FSIA.
' '49
Similarly, the Court found that the FSIA was irrelevant to the
procedural posture of the case. 50 Specifically, the Court observed that
section 1607(c) of the FSIA clearly allows counterclaims by private
defendants, even where the plaintiff is a "foreign state," which encom-
passes state instrumentalities and agencies. 51 In relevant part, section
1607 provides: "In any action brought by a foreign state ... the for-
eign state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any coun-
terclaim . . . to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief
exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the
state."' 52 In Banco, Citibank's claim was identical to Bancec's in that
both demanded money; Bancec for its letter of credit, and Citibank
for its confiscated branches. 53 The Court, therefore, held that the
counterclaim against Bancec remained procedurally and substantively
unaffected by the FSIA.
5 4
B. Choice of Law
Once the Court concluded that Bancec was amenable to a coun-
terclaim, it considered the issue of which law to apply in the case:
Cuban law, United States law, or New York corporate law. 55 Bancec
argued that Cuban law should determine the validity of both its origi-
nal claim and Citibank's counterclaim.5 6 This argument was based on
an international choice of law doctrine which requires the application
48. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976).
49. Banco, 462 U.S. at 621.
50. Id. at 620.
51. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C § 1607(c) (1983). This provision basically codifies the Court's holding in
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). There, the Court considered it
unfair for a government to sue in United States courts, yet shield itself from a counterclaim
based on the very laws that afford it a remedy. Id. at 361-63. Practically, the requirement that
the remedies sought by the two sides be similar is that both sides demand either legal or equita-
ble relief.
53. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
54. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
620-21 (1983).
55. Id. at 621-23.
56. Id. at 621.
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of the laws of a corporation's country of incorporation. 57 However,
the Supreme Court summarily dismissed this argument.58
The Court expressed concern that using the law of the country of
incorporation "would permit the state to violate with impunity the
rights of third parties under international law while effectively insulat-
ing itself from liability." 59 It distinguished a hypothetical situation
involving the internal affairs 6° of a corporation, 61 reasoning that the
law of the state of incorporation in that instance would be appropriate
for the protection of the "justified expectations of parties with inter-
ests in the corporation. '62 However, this interest is absent when the
involved parties are disinterested in the corporation's internal af-
fairs. 63 Therefore, where the rights of third parties are involved, dif-
ferent choice of law principles are deemed appropriate. 64
The Court next addressed Bancec's contention that the alterna-
tive body of applicable law should be the New York state law. 65
Bancec urged the Court to use both the commercial law and the
choice of law principles of New York. 66 However, the court also re-
57. E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 31 (1947); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 297 (1971). See also Nadelmann & Von Mehren, A
French Draft of a Law on Private International Law, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 614, 619 (1970);
Coester-Waltjen, German Conflict Rules and the Multi-National Enterprise, 6 GA. J. INT'L. &
COMP. L. 197, 202-06 (1976). In civil law countries, the law of the country of incorporation is
the applicable law in cases involving the corporation. E. RABEL, supra, at 33.
58. Banco, 462 U.S. at 621-22.
59. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
622 (1983).
60. Id. at 621. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
61. Banco, 462 U.S. at 621.
62. Id. Such choice of law principles, for example, would govern the solicitation of prox-
ies, election of directors and issuance of stock. Shareholders in a corporation know the state of
incorporation of their company. They also know that internal disputes regarding the manage-
ment and operation of their corporation are governed by the law of that state. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1989).
63. Cost prohibits outsiders to a corporation from ascertaining the corporation's state of
incorporation in every transaction. For example, a trade creditor cannot continually inquire
into the state of incorporation of his or her customers. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to
hold third parties to the laws of a state whose identity is practically unknown to them.
64. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
621 (1983).
65. Banco, 462 U.S. at 622 n.l !. This argument was founded on the premise that the
forum of the dispute should provide the appropriate rules of decision.
66. Bancec's argument rested on the similarity between § 2674 of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988), and § 1606 of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1988). Both sections provide that when the sovereign is amenable to suit, it "shall be liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."
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jected this assertion, 67 because if it adopted the forum state's choice of
law rules, the Court would expose the United States' foreign relations
to "divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. ' 68 To
avoid this potential problem, the Court adopted federal common law
as the appropriate law where attribution of liability among entities of
a foreign state is involved.69 Using federal rules of decision would
result in less inconsistency in cases involving foreign corporations.
C Presumption of Limited Liability
Before applying federal common law, the Court examined the
general nature of government corporations. 70 It concluded that many
of these corporations closely resemble private corporations. 71 Both
government and private corporations have specific powers and du-
ties,72 a board of directors, management 73 and a separate economic
identity.74 Furthermore, the Court accepted the proposition that legal
personality is "an almost indispensable aspect of the public corpora-
tion."'7 5 Finally, the Court observed that government corporations
are vested with "a greater degree of flexibility and independence from
close political control than is generally enjoyed by government
agencies." 7
6
Banco, 462 U.S. at 622 n. 11. The Court distinguished § 1606 of the FSIA as being silent
regarding the attribution of liability among entities of foreign countries. Id.
67. Banco, 462 U.S. at 622.
68. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)). For
example, if a state's choice of law rules required it to apply a foreign country's substantive law,
foreign governments could design laws so that its corporations could evade legal liability for
actions in the forum state. A foreign government could accomplish this by requiring its corpo-
rations to submit themselves only to the foreign government's jurisdiction.
69. Id.
70. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
624-27 (1983).
71. Id. at 623-28.
72. Id. at 624.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
625 (1983) (quoting Friedman, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis, in GOVERN-
MENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303, 333-34 (W. Friedman & J. Garner ed.
1970)). A legal personality allows the corporation to sue and be sued. This in turn encourages
creditors and suppliers to interact with the eritity with a greater degree of assurance that they
will be reimbursed upon default. Without legal personhood, creditors' hesitancy in extending
credit would cripple the government corporation's daily operations. Cf Amicus Curiae, infra
note 120, at 8-9.
76. Banco, 462 U.S. at 624-25.
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These characteristics, of course, directly result from the purpose
for which such corporations are founded. Government corporations,
[have] become an essential instrument of economic development in
the economically backward countries which have insufficient pri-
vate venture capital to develop the utilities and industries which
are given priority in the national development plan. Not infre-
quently, these public development corporations . . .directly or
through subsidiaries, enter into partnerships with national or for-
eign private enterprises . . .77
In short, government corporations have become part of the socioeco-
nomic fabric of many less-developed, or newly-industrialized
countries.7
8
Due to the similarities between private sector and governmental
corporations, both in form and overall purpose, the Supreme Court
extended the presumption of limited liability to government corpora-
tions.79 This position, the Court pointed out, was in accord with Brit-
ish court opinions.8° Most importantly, by granting government
corporations the presumptive shield of limited liability, the Court did
not undermine foreign governmental policies of establishing such en-
terprises. 81 A contrary holding would have "cause[d] third parties to
hesitate before extending credit to a government instrumentality with-
out the government's guarantee. ' ' 82 This presumption of limited lia-
bility for government corporations thus gives effect to principles of
77. Id. at 625 (quoting Friedman, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis, in
GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303, 333-34 (W. Friedman & J. Gar-
ner ed. 1970)).
78. Less developed countries, such as Bangladesh, Laos and Tanzania, are commonly
called LDCs. Likewise, newly industrialized countries, such as Hong Kong, South Korea and
Taiwan, are called NICs.
79. Banco, 462 U.S. at 626-27. Of course the government corporation must have been
duly organized, chartered, and registered so as to qualify for limited liability. These require-
ments must be met by all corporations, whether their stock is held by the government or
private investors. See, e.g., Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109
(1973) (requiring strict compliance with state incorporation statutes).
80. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
626 n.18 (1983). The Supreme Court noted that British courts "have shown marked reluc-
tance to attribute the acts of a foreign government to an instrumentality owned by that govern-
ment." Id. For example, in C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex, App. Cas. 351 (1979), the House
of Lords excused a Polish government agency from executing a sugar export contract because
of the Polish government's order banning such sales. The order was considered force majeure
and not imputable to the agency. See Banco, 462 U.S. at 626 n.18.
81. Banco, 462 U.S. at 625.
82. Id. at 626 (citing Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 499, 516-17 (1976)).
1990]
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comity and international economic cooperation.83
D. Piercing the Corporate Veil
As with private corporations, the Court held that the presump-
tive independence of governmental corporations may be overcome on
equitable grounds84 including unjust enrichment, fraud and consider-
ations of public policy. 85 It is generally accepted that a corporation's
shareholders may not abuse their privilege of limited immunity to vio-
late laws or rights of third parties.8 6 Likewise, these corporations may
not engage in self-dealings or acts unauthorized by the corporation's
charter.8 7 This principle is recognized worldwide88 and is embodied
in international common law.8 9
Next, the Court found Bancec to be the alter ego of the Cuban
government. 90 The Court stated that to give "effect to Bancec's sepa-
rate juridical status ... would permit the real beneficiary of such an
action, the Government of the Republic of Cuba, to obtain in our
courts [what] it could not obtain in its own right .... ,,91 In order to
prevent any potential unjust enrichment by Cuba, the Court looked
beyond the mere legal facade of Bancec and allowed Citibank to make
its counterclaim. 92 By granting this counterclaim, the Court forced
Cuba to take responsibility for nationalizing foreign properties.
The Court condemned Cuba's nationalizations as contrary to es-
83. The Court also adopted other doctrines within federal common law that allow such a
presumption to be rebutted. Instances in which the presumption of limited liability is rebutted
are commonly referred to as piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295 (1939).
84. Banco, 462 U.S. at 629.
85. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
629 (1983).
86. Id. at 629-30.
87. Id. at 630 (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417
U.S. 703 (1974)).
88. See generally Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970
I.C.J. 3. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 11 1(1) (Revised) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1980).
89. When nations repeatedly address an issue by their international practice, that issue
becomes a subject of international law. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir.
1980). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Filartiga, reprinted in 19 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 585, 588-89 (1980).
90. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
633 (1983).
91. Id. at 632.
92. Id. at 633.
[Vol. 12:799
Foreign Government Corporations
tablished international law.93 Cuba's seizure of United States business
assets was extensively litigated in United States courts, and the impro-
priety of this Cuban action had been established in prior cases.94
There was ample evidence that Cuba's actions were specifically aimed
at United States targets and carried out in bad faith.95 The equities of
Banco were strong enough, in the Court's opinion, to require Bancec
to defend the counterclaim. 96 In essence, Cuba wanted to use United
States law to receive payment on the letter of credit "but it wanted
our law [United States law] free from the claims of justice. '97
V. UNCLEAR CONCI.USIONS AND MISPLACED ASSUMPTIONS
Nevertheless, the Court failed to set forth a "mechanical
formula" to determine the amenability of foreign government corpo-
rations to suit. 98 Although the Court was correct in its holdings for
waiver of the FSIA, choice of law and the piercing of the corporate
veil, the Court was incorrect in assuming that government corpora-
tions are independent entities. Many of the reasons for the assumed
independence of private corporations simply do not exist for govern-
mental corporations. 99 The Court should have examined the real na-
ture of government corporations and set forth principles of law which
reflect those realities suggesting that government corporations are not
independent and .should not enjoy the presumption of limited liability.
A. Private Sector Factors Inapplicable to Government Corporations
The traditional policies favoring corporate limited liability are
grounded on the principle of promoting economic growth. 0° From
93. Id. For the view that the Court misunderstood the holding of cases allegedly charac-
terizing Cuba's actions as a violation of international law, see Note, Making Cuba Pay: Satis-
faction of Nationalization Claims Against Cuba, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 515, 536-39 (1984).
94. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1967). The Court in Banco specifically relied on Banco I.
95. See, e.g., Resolution 1, Aug. 6, 1960. Pursuant to Law No. 851 of Aug. 6, 1960
(specifically mentioning United States targets for nationalization). Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
633 (1983).
97. Id. at 632 (quoting National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361-62
(1955)).
98. Id.
99. Ghai, Law and Public Enterprise in Developing Countries, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 59 (V. Ramanadham ed. 1984).
100. See, e.g., Manne, infra note 113, at 260.
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this foundation, courts and commentators commonly advance eight
distinct rationales for granting limited liability to the shareholders of
a private corporation. The following is a discussion of the eight ratio-
nales and why those rationales do not apply to government
corporations.
First, one of the initial arguments supporting limited liability for
private corporations is that such a presumption reduces the need for
constantly monitoring corporate managers.' 10 If shareholders were
held liable for all consequences of management action, they would
have to expend considerable resources monitoring the managers. 10 2
These resources could conceivably exceed the shareholders' invest-
ments in the corporation. Therefore, in order to make investments
feasible, the law grants shareholders the privilege of limited liabil-
ity. 103 Under such a regime, shareholders are immune from claims of
voluntary and involuntary creditors exceeding their investment in the
corporation. 104
In contrast, this rationale does not apply in the case of govern-
ment corporations. In government corporations, the degree of in-
volvement by the sole shareholder-the government-is so great that
any additional need for monitoring by the government is unneces-
sary. 05 For example, government corporations commonly have one
or more ministers on their boards 10 6 who closely monitor the conduct
of the managers. 107 The minister often takes an active role in manag-
ing the corporation.108 Thus, when ministerial involvement is exten-
sive, the monitoring rationale does not apply. As the degree of
involvement increases, the need for monitoring decreases. In turn, as
the need for monitoring decreases, the need for a presumption of lim-
ited liability decreases. In government corporations, where the share-
holder is also the manager, 109 monitoring costs are slight. Thus, there
101. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89,
94-95 (1985).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (1986).
105. Brief for Respondent app. at a3, First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1986) [hereinafter Appendix].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. For the degree of U.S. government involvement in the affairs of U.S. government
corporations, see The Government Corporations Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9109 (1989).
109. Appendix, supra note 105, at a3.
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is no need to presume that the shareholders need a legal shield to
protect them from potentially costly acts of managers.
The second rationale for a presumption of liability for corpora-
tions has been the need to eliminate monitoring of other sharehold-
ers. I10 In a corporation without limited liability, shareholders are
jointly liable to the full extent of their respective wealth for corporate
obligations.III As such, there is a great incentive to have solvent fel-
low shareholders. Consequently, an individual shareholder will con-
stantly monitor the wealth of other shareholders to ensure that they
do not transfer their wealth to others, leaving the individual share-
holder exposed to large claims." I2 This rationale does not apply to
government corporations because they are by definition owned by a
single shareholder-the government.. Thus, there are no other share-
holders to be monitored.
A third rationale advanced for the grant of corporate limited lia-
bility is to promote the marketability and free transfer of shares. 113 If
a potential shareholder were required to monitor other shareholders
to ensure their solvency, he would be unwilling to purchase a share on
an organized market without knowledge as to the identity and sol-
vency of each shareholder. 114 This rationale is also inapplicable to a
government corporation. When the activities of the government cor-
poration are such that private enterprise is unwilling to invest in the
corporation or when the government has made a purposeful decision
to limit shareholdings in the enterprise, a grant of limited liability is
unnecessary. Because government shares are not intended to be pub-
licly traded, this rationale does not justify a grant of limited liability.
Fourth, giving managers incentives to act efficiently has been
cited as a rationale for extending limited liability to corporations."I 5
This rationale is essentially an extension of the "marketability" ra-
tionale. When managers in a corporation act inefficiently, sharehold-
ers use the free transferability of their own shares, afforded by limited
110. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 95.
111. W. CARY & A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 91-92
(1988).
112. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 95.
113. Manne, Our Two Corporation System: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 264-
65 (1967). Professor Manne advocates the theory that without limited liability, organized se-
curities markets would not be possible. Id. at 262.
114. Id.
115. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 95.
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liability, to divest themselves of those shares.11 6 As more and more
investors divest, the price of the shares will decline.1 17 This decline in
price creates an opportunity for an investor to "takeover" the corpo-
ration, run it efficiently, and realize a profit."18 However, because
government shares are not publicly traded, this extended marketabil-
ity theory is also inapplicable to government corporations. Even if
government shares were publicly traded, the types of businesses run
by these corporations typically discourage outside attempts at reor-
ganization, interference or investment." 19 This is because government
corporations take risks that would be prohibitive for the private
sector. 1
2 0
Two examples of such corporations in the United States include
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation and the Export-Import
Bank of the United States. The National Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration, commonly referred to as Amtrak, is the primary provider of
national rail transportation in the United States and has been consist-
ently unprofitable. 121 Despite recent efforts to increase productivity
and efficiency, Amtrak's revenues only cover seventy-two percent of
the cost of operating the service. 122 This revenue-to-cost ratio is actu-
ally a historic high. 12 3 More typically, in 1981, revenues provided less
than fifty percent of Amtrak's operating costs.
124
The Export-Import Bank of the United States ("Ex-Im Bank"),
whose capital is provided by the U.S. government, provides medium
and long-term credit to U.S. exporters. 125 Ex-Im Bank has suffered a
series of losses in recent years, 126 which indicates its unprofitability
116. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 701
(1982); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 78 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
625 (1983) (quoting Friedman, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis, in GOVERN-
MENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303 at 303-04 (W. Friedman & J. Garner ed.
1970)).
120. Id. See also Amicus Curiae brief of The International Center for Law in Develop-
ment at 6, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611
(1983) (No. 81-984) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae].
121. L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at 3, col. 2.
122. Id.
123.' Id.
124. Id. For more information on Amtrak's operations and financial status, and predic-
tions of its ultimate demise, see G. HAMILTON, AMTRAK: THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PAS-
SENGER CORPORATION 43-62 (1980).
125. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT.
126. Id. at 28.
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and unassignability to the private sector.
Furthermore, government corporations are more common in
less-developed countries where capital is scarce or prohibitive to the
average investor. 127 In effect, this prohibitive cost of capital prevents
private takeovers of government corporations in these countries.
Therefore, the expanded marketability rationale that assumes availa-
bility of capital fails to apply to the vast majority of situations where
government corporations exist. Additionally, most developing coun-
tries that form government corporations have an acute absence of
qualified managers in their labor market. 128 Thus, the assumption
upon which this rationale is based is undermined.
The fifth rationale for the grant of corporate limited liability is to
allow market prices to convey additional information about corpora-
tions. 129 If all shares are fundamentally alike, any decrease in share
price is reasonably attributable to lower expectations of corporate
profitability by the general public. 130 When the share price signals
lowered expectations, other investors are invited to compare the mar-
ket's expectation of profitability with their own assessment of the po-
tential profitability."' If an investor's personal assessment indicates a
better future than that predicted by the market, the investor will
purchase the stock. 132 If the converse is true, the investor will not buy
the stock and existing shareholders will sell their shares.
133
If shareholders were liable for the debts of the corporation to the
full extent of their wealth, stock prices would not reliably reflect accu-
rate market expectations of corporate profitability. Instead, the
shares would reflect both expected profitability and shareholders' sol-
vency. This mixture of information would then be useless to the in-
vestor in his analysis of the corporation as a profit-making entity.
Once again, this rationale does not apply to an entity whose shares are
not available to the public and whose activities are undesirable to
investors. 134
The sixth rationale for a grant of limited liability, like the preced-
127. Appendix, supra note 105, at al 1-a12.
128. Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at 6.
129. For an excellent discussion of how prices reflect and react to information, see Gilson
& Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549-92 (1984).
130. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 96.
131. C. JONES, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 260-69 (1985).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Appendix, supra note 105, at all-a 12.
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ing five, is applicable only when the shares of an entity are publicly
traded. According to this rationale, limited liability enables investors
to efficiently diversify their investments.135 Under a rule of unlimited
liability, investors would not diversify their holdings, as each addi-
tional investment would entail new risks associated with the manage-
rial conduct of the new enterprise. With limited liability, investors
need not worry about high risks of losing all their wealth because of
one large claim against a single corporation. As such, these investors
will be able to combine risky and safe investments to form an ideal
portfolio suited to their individual risk aversion and desired return. 
13 6
Since investors cannot diversify into government corporations, the
rule of limited liability does not apply to public enterprises. When
investors are barred from investing in government corporations,
either by choice or by law, limited liability of such corporations is
irrelevant to their investment calculations.
A seventh rationale for limited liability is that this legal privilege
allows managers to make optimal investment decisions for the corpo-
ration. 137 This theory states that when investors are not individually
liable for the corporation's debts, the managers will be able to make
investment decisions beneficial to the corporation, free from the threat
of severe shareholder impact. 38 However, this rationale is inapplica-
ble when an opportunity to invest in the corporation is absent. Thus,
when managers have only the interests of a single shareholder in
mind, due to lack of private investment opportunities, it is not neces-
sary to grant limited liability to the corporation. This situation exists
in the case of government corporations, so managers need only con-
sider the goals of the government. Therefore, the absence of a rule of
limited liability will not be as cumbersome for government managers
compared to private managers who must consider the interests of po-
tentially thousands of shareholders.
Finally, the grant of limited liability to corporate shareholders
reduces the capital costs for corporations, thereby increasing the
135. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 96.
136. C. JONES, supra note 131, at 558-60, 582. The concept of "efficient portfolios" which
provide maximum return for a given level of risk was originated by Harry Markowitz in his
seminal article "Portfolio Selection." See Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, J. OF FIN. 77 (Mar.
1952).
137. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 95.
138. "In the jargon of portfolio theory, when investors are or can be diversified, managers
should consider only systematic risk in making decisions. When investors cannot diversify
their holdings, managers should consider both systematic and unsystematic risk. The consid-
eration of unsystematic risk may lead them to forgo profitable investments." Id. at 97 n.12.
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availability of investment funds that would otherwise be unavaila-
ble. 139 According to this rationale, under a rule of unlimited liability,
creditors or potential investors would have to ascertain the risk asso-
ciated with lending a corporation funds by looking at the wealth of
individual shareholders. 140 Consequently, the costs associated with
such an assessment will be passed on to the corporation in terms of a
higher cost of capital. With limited liability for corporations, how-
ever, the creditors need only look to the corporation itself and assess
that single entity's financial health.141
This rationale, like others discussed above, is inapplicable to gov-
ernment corporations because the absence of potential equity inves-
tors renders this rationale irrelevant. Even if such an investment
market did exist, government ownership of a major stake in a corpo-
ration would make the entity less marketable, as uncertainty regard-
ing the political motivations of the managers would increase the risk
of such investments. Additionally, creditors of government corpora-
tions look to the government for payment of the corporation's
debts. 142 Therefore, the fiscal health of the government entity is a
minor consideration. Since government corporations are commonly
unprofitable entities,143 it is the government's fiscal health that is of
primary concern to the investor.
As illustrated above, the traditional theories for the presumption
of limited liability for private corporations are inapplicable to govern-
ment corporations. Additionally, there are compelling practical rea-
sons why government corporations should not be granted a
presumption of limited liability.
B. Case and Consequences for a Presumption of Liability
There are factors which support a rule favoring a government's
presumption of liability for the debts of their corporations. First,
since government corporations are innately political creatures, subject
to the commands of a political master, it is better to assume that such
corporations do not necessarily act out of economic motives.144 Man-
agers of such corporations, as well as their subordinates, are likely to
139. Id. at 98.
140. Id. at 101 (discussing this problem in the context of the corporation purchasing insur-
ance in the absence of limited liability).
141. Id.
142. Appendix, supra note 105, at a4.
143. Id. at a5.
144. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22, First
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be political appointees with particular political goals. 145 Thus, they
are more likely to overstep the bounds of basic economics and directly
or indirectly cause economic harm.146 Furthermore, in the event that
such harm does occur, it is likely to involve a greater quantum of
injury. 147
The second factor in favor of a presumption of liability is that
courts are more likely to pierce a corporate veil when excessive eco-
nomic risk-taking is present. 148 There is great potential for socially
excessive levels of risk-taking in government corporations. Govern-
ment employees are more secure in their positions as compared to
private employees. Public employees are less likely to be discharged
for bad judgment, and enjoy greater job security. 149 Therefore, the
potential for errant behavior is increased in government
corporations. iSo
Of course, this presumption of unlimited liability, by itself, will
not automatically expose government corporations to huge, unman-
ageable claims of destructive power. A general theory of law is that a
law of its own force does not affect economically feasible behavior.' 5 '
This theory is expressly recognized by scholars of government corpo-
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (No. 81-
984) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
-145. Id.
146. Appendix, supra note 105, at a3.
147. This likelihood of increased harm arises from the great economic wealth entrusted to
government corporations. For example, "[i]n Argentina, three-quarters or more of the sectors
of electricity, petroleum, coal, steel, railways, domestic air transport, maritime transport, gas
and re-insurance are covered by public enterprises ...." Id. at a2. A "high percentage of
[state trading organizations] have in fact monopolistic positions .. " Id. at a5 (quoting RE-
PORT, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF STATE TRADING ORGANIZATIONS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 29 MARCH-2 APRIL, at 10 (ICPE 1982). See also UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
148. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 109.
149. One reason for the establishment of government corporations is to limit the rights of
the employees under internal government regulations and to allow the managers of the corpo-
rations greater autonomy in hiring and firing of employees. Amicus Curiae. supra note 120, at
7-8.
150. It is also noteworthy that in many less developed countries, the lack of organization
and responsibility is widespread. Ghai, supra note 99, at 63. "[T]here is considerable confu-
sion as to who has responsibility for what[,] both at the level of the government and the level of
the enterprise," giving "[tihe overall impression in many countries ... of massive government
intervention but little control ...." Id. at 62-63.
151. This is generally known as the Coase Theorem. See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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rations.15 2 Thus, a rule of unlimited liability does not automatically
preclude the government corporation from taking other available
routes to limit its liability. Foremost among these alternatives is the
contract method. The government corporation could simply mandate
a standard practice of obtaining the consent of its creditors to seek
only the assets of the corporation itself, holding the government free
of any claims. Essentially, this shifts the burden to the government
corporation to exonerate itself of unlimited liability. .
Another protective alternative available to the government cor-
poration is insurance.1 53 This alternative is particularly important for
protection against involuntary creditors, such as tort victims of the
corporation's activities.154 In fact, such an alternative is more efficient
than a legal presumption of limited liability, as this insurance alterna-
tive internalizes agency costs and corporate externalities involved
with the operation of the corporation.
155
Finally, limited liability has not traditionally been deemed essen-
tial to the existence of corporations. In the early days of this coun-
try's existence, shareholders were frequently liable for all the claims of
their corporations. 56 Even today, there are statutes imposing per-
sonal liability on corporate stockholders for certain claims against the
corporation. 157 Thus, with the above alternatives available to govern-
ment corporations, the Court could have decided the case differently
with no adverse consequence to the legal implications of government
entities.
VI. RESULTING INJURY TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS ABROAD
The nebulous ruling in Banco satisfies neither the expectations of
152. "We know that the legal form of the enterprise is determinative of few outcomes.
There is ample evidence to show that the law has been unable to hold the prescribed balance
between control and autonomy." Ghai, supra note 99, at 59.
153. Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corpo-
ration Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 132 (1980).
154. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 107.
155. Id.
156. Some early statutes, such as those in Massachusetts, expressly imposed unlimited lia-
bility on the shareholders. Other states such as New York imposed double liability. P.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER COMMON
LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
23-27 (1987).
157. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630 (imposes personal liability for the wages of
certain employees on the 10 largest shareholders of a non-public corporation).
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foreign government corporations, who would like full immunity, nor
the demands of U.S. investors who want full access to sue such corpo-
rations. The Supreme Court stated that failing to grant the presump-
tion of limited immunity would "cause third parties to hesitate before
extending credit to a government instrumentality without the govern-
ment's guarantee." 15 However, if the Court had denied the presump-
tion, it could have encouraged credit extension, as potential creditors
would have gained confidence in their ability to resort to the courts in
case of a corporate default. 159
The Court itself recognized the need for more responsible foreign
government corporations. 160 One reason why the Court chose federal
choice of law principles over those of Cuba or New York was that
otherwise, the state could violate international law and yet be free
from liability. 161 However, the Court has not gone far enough to pre-
vent this potential state abuse. 162 The Court's holding, in effect,
stated that it will use choice of law principles to bring foreign govern-
ment corporations into United States' courts, 63 but will nevertheless
presume the foreign entity not liable. However, the reality of interna-
tional politics and economics, reflected in the non-corporate nature of
government corporations, strongly favors a rule of unlimited liability.
Foreign government corporations are also hurt by the Court's
holding because the Court has not reduced legal uncertainty for these
governments who conduct business in the United States. On one
hand, the Court holds that shareholders of foreign government corpo-
rations are entitled to limited liability. 164 On the other hand, the
Court states that if such corporations engage in certain conduct, such
as working too closely with their respective governments or following
the orders of these governments, this presumption of limited liability
will not apply. 165 However, as the Court itself noted, 166 this integral
158. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
626 (1983).
159. This follows since, in the absence of limited liability, the sole shareholder of the cor-
poration, the government, would have been fully liable for the debts of the corporation. W.
CARY & A. EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 91-92.
160. Banco, 462 U.S. at 622.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
621-23 (1983).
164. Id. at 629.
165. Id. (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960), for the proposition
that extensive control by a shareholder leading to a principal-agent relationship will cause the
shareholder to lose the presumption of limited liability).
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working relationship with government is always present in the case of
foreign governments. 1
67
Finally, the Court makes it more difficult for United States inves-
tors with nationalized properties abroad to seek legal redress. Differ-
ent branches of the same revolutionary government often conduct
nationalization programs. However, in such circumstances, United
States courts presume that these government agencies and instrumen-
talities are immune from liability. United States investors must now
resort to foreign courts which have traditionally been hostile to
United States economic interests. Yet these forced actions occur
when foreign governments have considerable assets in the United
States which are sufficient to meet all liabilities. 168 Furthermore, the
U.S. government already has the power to reach these U.S. based as-
sets through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 1
69
and the Trading with the Enemy Act. 70 These two provisions allow
seizure of a hostile government's assets in the United States. For ex-
ample, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act was used
in the 1980 hostage crisis to freeze Iranian assets in the United States
to satisfy claims of United States investors against the government of
Iran.171 Similarly, it is logical and desirable to extend this protection
to investors abroad.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's ruling in Banco was a diplomatic reflection
of the practicalities of the issue presented to the Court. When con-
fronted with a wrongful exercise of a foreign government's nationali-
zation powers, the Court chose to base its ruling on equitable grounds
when adequate legal grounds already existed for the same decision.
Although the Court achieved a legitimate result by the indirect means
of equity, the same principles of equity and justice should have com-
pelled the Supreme Court to go further. By presuming foreign gov-
166. Banco, 462 U.S. at 624. "[Government corporations are] created by an enabling stat-
ute that prescribes the powers and duties of the instrumentality, and specifies that it is to be
managed by a board selected by the government in a manner consistent with the enabling
law." Id.
167. Appendix, supra note 105, at a3.
168. In 1985, foreign investment in the United States was estimated at approximately $183
billion. T. CLASEN, supra note 11, at 255.
169. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1983).
170. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1983).
171. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1980); Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed.
Reg. 26,658 (1980); Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980).
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ernment corporations fully liable for the acts of their governments,
the Court could have effectively furthered the economic justice due
United States investors abroad.
Ebbi Izadian*
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